II: Logio S-4. (no date) 1936 EE/Bulgaria EE/

721 The occupation of Macedonia did not render the Radoslavov Gevernment any the more popular in the eyes of the people. The chief brunt of the fighting fell on the Bulgarians, because the Germans after reaching Kragujevats withdrew their forces and left only one army corps to support Bulgaria. This relieved to some extent the pressure on the Serbian army and enabled it to retreat through Albania to the Adriatic. Apparently von Mackensen's plan was to open up communications with Turkey and did not consist of annihilating the Serbian army which would have involved much greater sacrifices for the Germans. After completing the conquest of Macedonia, the Bulgarian army leaders insisted on occupying Salonica, so as to eliminate an eventual enemy thrust from that quarter in order that they might then proceed to the partial demobilisation of the army; to this demand, however, the Germans opposed a resolute refusal. They considered that the maintenance of the Salonica front suited best their purpose, for the Bulgarian army which could not be employed in th west, could be used to tie down a corresponding number of Entente troops which would necessarily be detached from the Western front where otherwise they would have to be faced by Germans. Radoslavov in his „Bulgaria and the world crisis", p.137/8, affirms that:

„The attack on Salonica was not undertaken because it was believed that Greece would eventually join the Central Alliance. She had already permitted the taking of Rupel, Drama, and Cavalla according to a written prearranged plan. Early in 1916 von Falkenhayn decided not to take Salonica and was supported by Hindenburg though General Conrad von Hötzendorf held the contrary view. Soon after the occupation of Serbia, serious divergences arose between Bulgaria and Austria over Prizren and Prishtina, both States demanding their incorporation into their respective territory".

724 648 Serious difficulties were created also through the Germans attempting to lay hands on all available supplies in Bulgaria and through their forcing the Bulgarian army

724 648 commissariat to furnish provisions far beyond those necessary for the limited number of German troops on the Macedonian front. In the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet it was revealed that while the Germans had between 16,000 and 18,000 troops on the Southern front they were drawing rations for over 100,000 men. The balance above their requirements was sent to Germany. Each German soldier had the right to send 5kg of foodstuffs a week home, and for this purpose there was a perpetual stream of German soldiers arriving in Bulgaria from occupied Serbia buying up provisions and returning. This extensive draining of the resources of Bulgaria, increased through the illicit export of provisions systematically undertaken by the Ministers and their supporters, caused a serious dearth. Minister Pechev notes in his Memoirs, 22. XII. 1935:

„To Ghendovitch and other deputies was being granted a licence to export 200 truck-loads of flour. Shameful. Often the names of Ministers figure in the minutes of Cabinet sittings at which export licences have been granted, though the Ministers were not present"

These malpractices took such a scandalous form that they even impressed a former Prussian Minister of War, General Dr. Stein, who alludes to them in his „Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges", published in Leipzig in 1919. In order to protect the food supply of the troops, General Jostov, the chief of the Staff, notified von Mackensen, without consulting the Government, that no more German troops were to be sent to Macedonia owing to the difficulty of providing them with supplies. Radoslavov in his book (Op. cit. p. 139) affirms that this was a pretext, and that Jostov considered that the aim of the war having been attained, Bulgaria ought 721 to seek to conclude peace with the Entente. When Ru- 648 mania declared war against Austria-Hungary, influential circles in Bulgaria attempted to maintain Bulgaria neutral